Exporters have not given up on 2026. Even after the war in the Middle East added another shock to a global economy already strained by tariffs, weaker demand and lower consumer confidence, 75% of companies in Allianz Trade’s latest global survey still expect positive export growth this year. That is a six-point drop from before the conflict, but far less dramatic than the 40-point collapse in confidence recorded after the 2025 tariff shock. Exporters are still looking for growth. They are just doing so in a world that is costlier, messier and much harder to read.

The 2026 Allianz Trade Global Survey, based on two waves of responses from 6,000 companies across 13 markets in February and March, captures that tension clearly. The report anticipates global GDP growth of 2.6% in 2026, global inflation of 4.3%, and stronger fiscal pressure as higher energy and input costs combine with weak demand and an effective US tariff rate of 10.5% to squeeze margins. Even in the best-case scenario, a post-ceasefire recovery in the Strait of Hormuz would reach only 15% to 30% of normal levels for a time, showing how slowly physical trade routes can recover even after violence subsides.

Confidence has held up, though not evenly. Vietnamese, US and Spanish firms each lost more than 10 percentage points of export confidence after the conflict began. Chinese firms, already weakened by the trade war, lost nine points, leaving only 51% expecting positive export growth. That is still optimism, but much thinner than elsewhere.

Aylin Somersan Coqui, chief executive of Allianz Trade, says the impact of the Middle East conflict “seems moderate, even more when compared to the 2025 tariff shock”, but added that “this optimism remains fragile and could quickly fade if the conflict drags on.” Her point is that the war has not crushed confidence, but it has changed what companies fear most.

The risk map has been redrawn

The clearest shift in the survey is geopolitical. Political and geopolitical risk, including wars, tariffs, expropriation and social unrest, is now the leading concern for 65% of firms, up 11 percentage points from 2025. That displaces supply chain complexity and concentration, which has fallen to third place at 45%, down 30 points. In second place now sit supply-related risks such as supplier bankruptcies and shortages of inputs, cited by 57% of firms, a jump of 30 points.

Companies are no longer treating geopolitics as a distant backdrop to operational decisions. It has moved to the centre of them.

The economic cost of that shift is already substantial. Allianz Trade estimates the cost of supply chain complexity reached US$4.7 trillion in 2025, more than double its 2017 level, with 56% linked to US trade flows. That helps explain why firms have been moving so decisively since the start of the tariff war. Four in five, or 80%, say they have adjusted their trade and supply chain routes since “Liberation Day” to avoid tariffs and geopolitical risk.

For many firms, de-risking is no longer a contingency plan. It is how they now operate. Seven out of ten companies say they have taken operational steps to adapt since the trade war began. Inventory building and market diversification are the most common responses, both cited by 64% of firms. Close behind is sourcing from new suppliers, at 63%, followed by rerouting through third markets, at 57%.

The national breakdown shows how uneven that response has become. China leads on rerouting, with 69% of firms using that strategy, and on market diversification, with 75%. Germany, by contrast, has the lowest diversification rate at 52%. On shipping and customs, half of firms affected by the Middle East conflict are now seeking alternative routes or carriers, rising to 60% in Vietnam and 55% in both the US and India. Another 50% are working with customs brokers to speed clearance, including 64% in Vietnam and 56% in India, while 48% are adjusting delivery schedules, notably in France, Brazil, India, the UK and the US.

Ano Kuhanathan, head of corporate research at Allianz Trade, notes that, by contrast: “changes to Incoterms (36%) remain more limited, suggesting that contractual adjustments lag operational ones”. That is visible in the survey’s Incoterms data. Exporters’ use of Delivered Duty Paid has fallen sharply from 25% to 16%, showing a growing reluctance to absorb tariff liability. At the same time, importers’ use of Free on Board has risen to 30%, up 10 points, as buyers seek tighter control over logistics.

Logistics, inventory and route planning are now feeding directly into treasury decisions. Cash is tied up differently when inventories are built up. Payment timing changes when routes are longer or customs processes are more complex. Margin assumptions shift when transport, energy and supplier risk all move at once. Those decisions are no longer just operational. They now shape working capital, hedging assumptions and how much liquidity firms feel they need on hand.

Pressure is already visible in the survey’s country breakdown. Logistics and energy are the most immediate concerns for many firms, with 60% worried about supply chain disruption and rising energy and commodity prices. Concern is especially high in Vietnam at 79%, Poland at 76%, the UK at 72% and the US at 71%. Indian and Chinese firms appear less worried by comparison. Yet fewer than a quarter of companies say they are worried about the direct shockwaves from the conflict on energy and shipping, suggesting many still believe either that they have buffers in place or that the disruption will prove temporary.

Trade finance is tightening as payment cycles stretch

While companies have moved quickly on operations, finance is proving harder to steady. The survey shows payment terms deteriorating again after the conflict began. The share of firms expecting terms to worsen has rebounded to 43%, up five points from pre-conflict levels. The steepest rises are in Brazil, up 18 points, the UAE, up 10, and India and Vietnam, both up nine.

At the same time, payment cycles are lengthening structurally. Only 7% of companies now say they are paid within 30 days, down four points from 2025 and down from 10% since the start of the conflict. At the other end of the scale, 24% are now paid after more than 70 days, up seven points year on year and up from 15% before the conflict. Large firms are particularly exposed: 42% of companies with turnover above €3bn face payment terms longer than 70 days.

Longer payment cycles do more than delay cash. They raise working capital needs, increase reliance on short-term funding and make liquidity planning harder across the chain. The most exposed sectors are transport equipment, pharmaceuticals, and computers and telecoms. Pharmaceuticals, construction, and computers and telecoms are also the sectors most exposed to rising fears of non-payment. Overall, 40% of firms now expect non-payment risk to rise, up six points from before the conflict.

For treasury, the strain is easy to see. Companies receiving cash later are more reliant on buffers, financing lines and stronger receivables discipline. Companies facing greater non-payment risk have to think harder about credit insurance, buyer screening and the cost of carrying risk across borders. This is the point at which geopolitical stress stops being a headline risk and starts hitting day-to-day treasury management: slower cash conversion, tighter funding capacity and less room for forecasting mistakes.

Despite the disruption, most firms are still funding themselves in familiar ways. Bank loans are still the most common source of financing at 46%, followed closely by internal cash flow at 44%. State support has become less important than it was in last year’s survey.

The trade war has also altered how companies think about tariffs and margin defence. Some 43% still expect a net negative impact from the trade war, higher than the 39% recorded before it began. Concern is sharpest in China, where 50% expect a net negative effect, and in Germany, where 49% do. Yet fewer firms now plan to raise prices because of tariffs. That share has fallen to 32%, down six points and back to pre-Liberation Day levels. Instead, investment strategies are becoming slightly more expansionary again: 28% now prioritise capital expenditure, up from 20% in 2025, while cost-cutting has dropped to 26% from 31%.

Firms are either swallowing more of the pain or finding ways around it, instead of pushing higher costs straight on to customers.

Trade is being redirected, not abandoned

The survey suggests trade is being rerouted, not rolled back. The US has not recovered its appeal after the tariff shock. Only 13% of firms now consider it a growth market, down from 17% in 2025. Europe and Asia, by contrast, are gaining favour. Interest in Europe has grown especially strongly among Singaporean exporters, up 10 points, and US exporters, up nine. Asia-Pacific excluding China is emerging as the clearest beneficiary of supply chain realignment, with Vietnam, India, Indonesia and Malaysia drawing investment flows.

China’s appeal has weakened sharply, though the pullback remains measured. Self-retention among China-based firms has fallen from 32% to 16%, while only 23% of firms globally now plan to increase their footprint there, down 30 points from 2025. Only 10% are actively planning to exit, however, which suggests disengagement is selective rather than wholesale.

Reshoring is also changing shape. The Middle East conflict has accelerated reshoring intent in Europe, led by Poland, the UK and France, while US and Vietnamese firms have moved the other way. Overall, 72% of exporters expect reshoring either to continue at the same pace or accelerate. Constraints remain heavy, though. Around 83% cite supplier-related issues such as lack of access to, or limited quality among, domestic suppliers. Production costs are a barrier for 67%, while 61% cite a lack of tax incentives or subsidies.

Trade agreements are another bright spot. A wave of new FTAs, including India-EU and MERCOSUR-EU, is attracting strong interest, with 93% of firms saying they plan to use them to expand. India, Brazil, Vietnam and France are emerging as priority markets. Yet, as Ana Boata, head of economic research at Allianz Trade, puts it, “non-tariff barriers, particularly licensing and certification requirements, continue to be the dominant friction” limiting firms from turning trade agreement access into export growth.

ESG fractures and AI splits into two speeds

The survey becomes more divided on longer-term themes such as sustainability and AI. On ESG, the previous sense of convergence has broken down. Commitment to sustainability action has fallen 22 points to 62%, from 84% in 2025. 

China has seen the sharpest drop, down 42 points to 47%, while the UK is down 29 points to 55%. Germany has held firmer, slipping only nine points to 76%. Firms are focusing more on supply chain measures, cited by 59%, than on internal governance reform, at 34%, or executive incentives, at 29%. Yet climate ambition has not disappeared. Some 26% are targeting CO2 reductions of 5% to 10%, up four points, and 84% remain confident of reaching net zero.

AI tells a similar story of widespread use but far less agreement about what it will actually deliver. Adoption is now almost universal, with only 0.5% of exporters saying they do not use it. But depth of deployment varies sharply. The UAE leads with 86% reporting scaled adoption, followed by Poland at 80% and India at 75%. The UK lags at 57% and the US at 63%.

The bigger divide lies in expectations. Some 61% of Indian firms think AI will lift export turnover by at least 10%, compared with just 18% to 22% in Europe. UAE firms offer a useful contrast. They are deploying AI at scale, but only 22% expect a strong growth impact, implying that usage there is more about efficiency than expansion. Globally, the main barrier is not cost or skills, but uncertainty over return on investment, cited by 28% of firms.

Even here, the Middle East conflict has had an effect. The share of firms expecting AI to drive export growth of more than 10% has fallen by eight points from roughly 30% before the war. Firms still believe the technology matters, but geopolitical stress is making companies more cautious about the scale and speed of the payoff. More broadly, the survey suggests companies are still willing to spend, but only where the payback is clearer and resilience gains come faster.

The survey’s central finding is that exporters are still prepared to push forward. Confidence has bent rather than broken. But the conditions under which they are trading have changed decisively. Geopolitics now leads the risk agenda, payment terms are stretching, de-risking has become routine, and growth opportunities are being sought in more selective, more regionally grounded ways. For treasurers and finance teams, the brief is broadening fast. Route changes now feed into liquidity planning. Slower payments are tying up cash for longer. Exposure management is getting harder. Growth is still there, but it is arriving with more friction.